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Abstract 
The impact  of  migrants on  the  host  country's  wages has been  an  important issue for 
policy makers and has attracted much research attention. Since no consistent conclusion 
has been reached regarding this impact, the debate over immigration policy continues in 
many countries. This paper constructs a theoretical dynamic general equilibrium model 
by  which  the  transitional and  long-run  effects  of  a migration  shock  on  endogenous 
.  variables, including the wage  differential,  can be illuminated, Consistent results from 
different  scenarios are obtained:  first, the  wage  differential is boosted  by  permanent 
migrants in both  the short and the long run; second, if  migrants stay temporarily, the 
wage differential increases in the short run and the effect dies out in the long run; third, 
unskilled  migrants have  a  smaller  effect  on the wage  differential  while  engaging in 
unskilled-labour intensive production than in skilled-labour intensive production; fourth, 
permanent migrants impel domestic workers to upgrade skills by demanding an increased 
amount of education. 
JEL classijication: C6 1  ;  C68; D 10; D9 1  ;  J3  1 1.  Introduction 
Migration  has  been  a  significant  phenomenon  around  the  world  over  the  last  two 
centuries, At the end of the 20th century, about 140 million persons- or roughly 2% of the 
world's population- resided in a country where they were not born (Borjas 1999). From 
the mass migration in the eighteenth century, which brought millions of Europeans to the 
America, to the recent rapidly growth of immigrants within Asia, this labour movement 
alters the labour endowment in both the source and host countries. The impact of  the 
labour movement  on the host country's  wages and unemployment levels has attracted 
much attention in the existing research. Due to the fact that no consistent conclusion has 
been provided, there is ongoing debate over immigration policy in many countries. This 
paper focuses on the issue of  the effect of  migration on the wage differential between 
skilled and unskilled labour in the host country. By taking the Borjas' (1994) suggestion 
that we do not understand the "dynamic process through which natives respond to these 
supply shocks and reestablish labor market equilibrium" into account, this paper adopts a 
new  methodology, Dynamic Intertemporal General Equilibrium (DIGE) modeling1, and 
constructs a theoretical model  of  a closed economy, which blockades other effects but 
migration  from  outside  of  the  host  country,  to reinvestigate the  issue  of  the  wage 
differential.  By  using  the  DIGE  modeling  framework,  we  can  study the transitional 
dynamics following shocks to the system, A relatively comprehensive framework with 
one-good,  two-labour  (skilled  and  unskilled)  and three-agent (firms, households, and 
government)  is  established. In  consideration  of  temporary migration  and  permanent 
' The model follows the general approach of  the G-Cubed model  (McKibbin and Wilcoxen  1999). The 
endogenized skill formation and education production follow the  model in Chang  (1999) with  a novel 
application on the migration issue. migration, simulations of this theoretical model illustrate an  overall picture of  the effect 
of  migration  on  the  wage  differential  in  a  dynamic  process.  Important  insights  and 
implications for immigration policies are discussed. Since it is a theoretical model, it can 
be applied to a range of countries only by changing the appropriate parameters. 
A large amount of research investigating the effect of immigration on native wages and 
the  findings have mixed  results.  One viewpoint is that  there  is  little  evidence  of  an 
adverse wage effect of immigration, such as Butcher and Card (1991) and Heckman et a1 
(1998).  The  other  viewpoint  suggests  that  immigration  adversely  affects  less-skilled 
native wages (Lalonde and Tope1 199  1, Altonji and Card 1991, Kuhn and Wooton 1991, 
Borjas et al  1992, Borjas et a1  1996 and Friedberg and Hunt  1995). Almost all of the 
empirical studies in this literature using the spatial correlations approach have produced a 
confusing  array  of  results2 (Borjas  1999).  Substantial efforts  regarding  methodology 
innovation  have  been  made.  Altonji  and  Card  (1991)  and  Schoeni  (1997)  use 
instrumental  variable  estimations;  however,  they  end  with  very  different  estimates 
(Borjas 1999). Heckman et al (1998) and Kuhn and Wooton (1991) use the dynamic and 
the  static  general  equilibrium  approach  respectively to  look  at  the  issues  of  wage 
inequality  and  native  wages.  Inconsistent  conclusions  result  from  their  models.  In 
contrast to these existing general equilibrium models, this paper constructs a relatively 
The spatial correlation is the relationship between labour market outcomes in a locality and the extent of 
immigrant penetration. The sign of the relevant coefficient changes erratically over time. 
4 comprehensive dynamic  framework in  which  government  plays  an  important  role of 
supplying education and wages are determined by labour supply and demand3. 
The following section  outlines the theoretical  framework  of  the  model.  Section three 
presents tlhe  simulation results from considering a range  of  scenarios of  migration and 
section four discusses the conclusions reached. 
2.  Th~e  Model 
The framework of  this model  is  as  follows: firms produce the  single good by  hiring 
physical  capital, skilled labour  and  unskilled labour,  they  then  sell  this  good  to the 
householcls for consumption, to the government for education capital investment and to 
themselves for physical capital investment. The objective of each firm is to maximize its 
intertemporal profit. The ownership of firms belongs to households. Households supply 
unskilled labour to firms and skilled labour to both firms and the government in order to 
earn wages which, together with the dividends from renting physical  capital to firms, 
finance the purchase of goods and education. Leisure is consumed by the households with 
an opportunity cost of not working. The objective of households is to maximize utility by 
an optimid distribution of  consumption between the good and leisure. The government 
buys  the  good  from  firms  and  transforms  it  into  education  capital.  This  capital  is 
combined with skilled labour hired by the government to produce education. The role of 
government  as  an  education supplier is  essential.  This model  captures  the  reality  of 
Heckman et a1 (1998) is the only existing research using a dynamic general equilibrium model. However, 
in their model, government plays  a limited role in  subsidizing human capital  and is put  aside  in their 
analysis. In  addition, the wage equation in their research is in an ad hoc form. government  supplying  education  in  consideration  of  the  associated  beneficial 
externalities. The government balances its budget by  collecting labour income tax4 and 
selling education to the household. The accumulation of physical capital, skill formation, 
education capital and financial assets drives the dynamic evolution of the economy over 
time. 
2.1  Firms 
The production function of the representative firm is assumed to be constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) as follows 
1 
(1) 
1-a  P  P 
Qt  = [KP  + (qa  L,,  )  1- 
where Q is the output and K,  L:,  L,,  are respectively  the physical capital  stock, the 
skilled labour and the unskilled labour hired by the firm. p and a are parameters. 
Capital accumulation depends on  the rate  of  fixed capital formation J  and the rate of 
depreciation 6. 
Under the assumption of  rising marginal costs of  installation in the investment process, 
the total investment expenditure I is 
To avoid unnecessary complexities, a subsidy rate on investment is assumed to be offset by a tax rate on 
financial dividends. 
6 where 0 is a positive parameter, and ($/2)(Jt/K,) is the unit cost of  adjustment, which is 
assumed to be a linear function of the rate of capital formation. 
The curre~lt  value Hamiltonian function is employed to solve the above autonomous one 
state variable  system with h as the shadow price of  capital. By  solving the first-order 
differential equation and applying the transversality condition, the shadow price of capital 
becomes 
(4)  h(t) = !,"  [QK  + ($/~)(J/K)~]  e-(r+6)'S  .  ds, 
where  QK  is the marginal product of  capital and (@/~)(J/K)~  is the marginal product of 
capital in reducing adjustment costs in investment at each point in time. Therefore, h is 
the increment to the real value of the firm from a unit increase in its investment at time t. 
2.2  Households 
The  aim  of  the  household  is to maximize  its intertemporal  utility  subject to  several 
constraints. 
Max,  1;  U(Ca It) .  e-Ot - dt 
Subject to 
(5  1  dF/dt = r-Ft  + (1- T)  - (Ws,t.Ls,t  + W,.t*L,,,t)-  Ct -  PE,~  *  SE,~, 
(6)  dLs/dt = Js,t - 6s .  Ls,t, 
Js,, 
S,,  = J,,  + -  - -1  , 
2  Ls,, 
(8)  Ft = ht  .  Kt, where Ct is the consumption  of  the  good,  1, is the leisure taken.  0 is the rate of  time 
preference, r  is the interest rate, Ft is financial assets, T is the tax rate, W,  and W,  are, 
respectively the wage rates of slulled and unskilled labour, P,,, is the price of one unit of 
education,  S,,,  is the amount of  education bought, J,,t is fixed skill formation, 6, is the 
depreciation  rate of shll, L,, is the amount of  skilled labour,  is the adjustment cost 
parameter and ht  is the shadow price of capital. 
Equation  (5)  is  the  household's  budget  constraint.  Equation  (6) shows that net  skill 
accumulation  is skill  depreciation  subtracted  from fixed  skill  formation, Equation (7) 
states that education investment depends on fixed skill formation and an adjustment cost 
function. The adjustment cost relies on the ratio of fixed skill formation to skilled labour. 
When an economy has more skilled labour, the adjustment cost becomes smaller. This is 
plausible due to the spillover effect among labour. The marginal adjustment cost of skill 
formation is positive and follows an increasing rate. This states that, in a resource limited 
economy, resources become more expensive when more resources are drawn into use for 
skill formation. 
The current value Hamiltonian function is employed to solve the above autonomous two- 
state variables  system with  and  ~2  as the respective shadow prices for the financial 
asset and skill. The shadow price of  skill is greater than the shadow price of the financial 
asset because the total cost of forming a unit of skill is greater than that of accumulating 
one unit of financial  asset, due to the adjustment cost of  skill formation. If  the shadow 
price of skill is not greater than that of the financial asset, the household would prefer to defer  spending on  skill  formation  and instead  accumulate financial  assets  for  future 
consumption. 
Applying the transversality condition to the shadow price of skill, pz,  results in 
Equation (9)  states that the shadow price of skill is equal to the present discounted value 
of future: marginal utility. The first component of the shadow price of  skill contains the 
marginal utility of consuming goods, the after-tax skilled wage, and the reduction of the 
adjustment cost in education investment. It provides the gross increment  of  utility the 
household can get from supplying one additional unit of skilled labour, The second part is 
the marginal disutility of offering one unit of skilled labour. Combining these two gives 
the net utility the household can achieve by supplying one unit of skilled labor. 
2.3  Government 
Government is a supplier of education. The education production function is 
1 
(10)  ct  2  Et  =  f (I,,  9 L:,  = (11,  +  L,,t  1  3 
where E is the education supply, KE is the education capital, L:  is skilled labour working 
for government  and 5 is a parameter. The interpretation of  KE could be the hardware 
associated with  schooling, egg.,  classroom,  equipment,  etc.  L:  could  be the  software 
associated with schooling, e.g., teachers, administrators, etc. Education capital accumulates via governmental investment in education as follows 
(1  1)  dKJdt = I:,,  -  6,  .  K,,,, 
where  It  is the government investment in education, and  (TE is the depreciation rate of 
education capital. 
2.4  The Steady-State 
A full model  in  a steady state is presented in Appendix  1. This model  produces the 
following relationship between skilled and unskilled wage in the steady state5, 
The expression of equation (12) is independent of the functional form of  both the utility 
and  production  functions6. It  provides  a  rigorous  theoretical  result  for  the  wage 
differential. The relationship between the skilled and unskilled wage depends on the rate 
of  time preference, the depreciation rate of  skill, the skill adjustment cost parameter, the 
tax rate and the price of education. A higher skill adjustment cost, skill depreciation rate, 
or time preference all tend to raise the wage differential. The reason  why  higher skill 
adjustment  costs  and  higher  skill  depreciation  rates  raise  the  wage  differential  is 
straightforward. The reason for a larger time preference having this effect is that the rate 
of time preference counts because an investment in skill formation takes time to repay. A 
larger time preference involves a larger adjustment cost for skill formation, therefore a 
patient household will expect a higher skilled wage. 
Due to the complicated framework, it is not possible to solve for a reduced form of the wage differential. 
A detailed proof is available from the author. The government's migration policy plays an important role in the wage differentia1 via its 
impact on the education price and taxation. An intuition of the effect of migration on the 
wage  differential is  that migrants as unskilled labour participate in the production  of 
goods and therefore pressure the domestic unskilled workers to upgrade their skills. This 
boosts the price of education, resulting in an increased wage differential. What matters in 
a general equilibrium is the interactive effect of the education price and the tax rate. More 
details on policy implications obtained by the simulation results are discussed in the next 
section. 
2.5  Migration in the Model 
Migrants are an exogenous unskilled work force in goods production after their arrival, 
Migrants  are  assumed to pay  the same tax rate  as local  workers.  Three cases  of  the 
migrants'  status are considered: first, migrants who stay in the country temporarily, i.e., 
they only stay for a period of time and then they leave the country; second, migrants who 
stay in the country permanently, but they work as unskilled labour all the time, i.e,, they 
do not take part in education; third, migrants who become permanent residents and start 
to take part in education to upgrade skills after an initial settlement period. The first and 
second cases represent a temporary and permanent shock for unskilled labour in goods 
production. The third case states that migrants can also work as skilled labour in goods 
production  after  the  first  period  of  arrival.  In  the  first  period,  migrants  create  an 
exogenous  shock  for  unskilled  labour  and  after  that,  migrants  become  permanent additional skilled and  unskilled workers. The migrants working as skilled or unskilled 
labour are endogenous in the economy. 
3.  Simulation Results 
The production of this one-type of  good could be skilled-labour intensive or unskilled- 
labour intensive. The simulations take into account different labour intensities in goods 
production  and three cases of  the migrants' status stated previously. To carry out these 
different  situations, parameters  and  exogenous variables  are  calibrated  as  shown  in 
Appendix 2  and an  experiment for each case is  demonstrated by  giving an  increased 
quantity of migated unskilled labour equal to 1 per cent of the domestic unskilled labour, 
The calibration is based on good empirical knowledge albeit subjective. For solving this 
nonlinear  system,  this  calibration  provides  reasonable  time  frames  of  variables' 
transitions between the initial and the new steady state after shocks. Table 1 summarizes 
the results of the simulations and Appendix 3 shows the dynamic paths. 
Table 1. The Effect of  Migration on the Wage Differential (%) 
Skilled-Intensive Production  Unskilled-Intensive Production 
Tem~orary  No EDUN  EDUN  Temporary  No EDUN  EDUN 
Short-run  0.42  0.21  0.28  0.21  0.37  0.37 
Long-run  0  1.25  0.41  0  0.39  0.47 
Note:  No EDUN  stands for  the  case that  migrants who  are  permanent  unskilled labour  and  take  no 
education; EDUN stands for the case that migrants who stay permanently and can choose to take education 
to upgrade their skills. Numbers for Short-run are those in the first period following shocks, 
3-1  Skilled-Labour Intensive Good 
3.1.1  Temporary Migration The wage differential increases in the short run with a jump to 0.42 per cent immediately 
after the shock and then drops back to the original level in the long run. In the short run, 
the new unskilled workers step into the production of goods, which boosts the marginal 
productivity  of  skilled  labour  and  therefore,  raises  the  skilled  wage.  This  motivates 
domestic unskilled workers to obtain more education and become skilled labour. Because 
skill formation takes time, the extra demand for skilled labour in the education sector is 
initially  &awn  from the goods  sector.  Firms prefer  to  substitute unskilled labour for 
skilled labour due to the increase in the skilled wage. This induced demand for unskilled 
labour increases the unskilled wage and motivates households to work harder by reducing 
leisure. The result for the  short-run  growth  in  the  wage  differential comes  from the 
increased size of the skilled wage being larger than the increased size of the unskilled 
wage. 
After the removal of migrants from goods production, the skilled wage drops below the 
original level  due  to  the  glut  of  skilled  labour, then  gradually  increases back  to the 
benchmark. The  unskilled  wage  also  gradually  decreases back  to  the original level. 
Therefore, the wage differential drops after the departure of the migrants, then in the long 
run, it adjusts back to the original level. 
3.1.2  Pt:rrnanent  Migration without Subsequent Education The wage differential increases in both the short and long run. The increased extent in the 
long run is larger than that in the short run, i.e. the wage differential increases by 0.21 per 
cent in the first period after the shock and jumps to 1.25 per cent in the new steady state. 
In the short run, the effect of these increased unskilled migrants on the wage differential 
is similar to the case of a temporary stay, i.e. the skilled wage increases to a larger extent 
than the  unskilled  wage  does. However, unlike the case  of  a temporary  shock, when 
migrants work in goods production permanently,  domestic unskilled labour is crowded 
out in the short run and takes more leisure. The reason for more leisure being affordable 
for households is that the increases  in both  skilled and unskilled  wages result in  the 
income effect dominating the  substitution effect. However, over time as the domestic 
workers  confront  the  competition  from  the  migrants  as  unskilled  labour,  more  are 
motivated to become skilled labour and also tend to reduce leisure. One important point 
is that production is raised in the short run due to more labour being available and more 
demand created by  migrants and households, but it decreases in the long run because 
more resources in the economy are withdrawn from the goods sector to the education 
sector and less physical capital is accumulated. This result shows an interesting issue that 
migrants who stay in a host country as unskilled labour permanently could actually affect 
its physical capital formation and slow down its economic growth. In the long run, the 
skilled wage  is increased further than that in the short run, in line with  more skilled 
labour demanded in the education sector. This is the reason why in the long run the wage 
differential  is  larger than  that  in the  short run.  This experiment  sheds  light  on  the importance of  adopting a policy to ensure the growth of  the capital when more unskilled 
migrants move into an economy. 
3.1.3  Permanent Migration with Subsequent Education 
In this cise migrants  are treated in the  same way  as  domestic workers after the first 
period of arrival. That is, when they just arrive in the host country, they work as unskilled 
labour. After this initial period they can choose to upgrade themselves to skilled labour 
by taking education. 
Although  the  wage  differential  follows  a  similar  transition  to  that  in  the  case  of 
permanent migration without subsequent education, i.e. the wage differential increases in 
both shor-t  and long run and the increase in the long run is larger than that in the short run, 
a range of  other variables react differently. The wage differential increases by 0.28 per 
cent in the first period after the shock and grows to 0.41 per cent in the new steady state. 
In the first period after more unskilled labour is injected into the economy, key variables 
such as the skilled wage and the unskilled wage follow a similar transition to that in the 
case without education. However, two points should be highlighted. First, for the case in 
which migrants can choose to become skilled labour, (in contrast to the case in which 
migrants remain in the category of unskilled labour) the domestic labour works harder by 
reducing leisure. This is because the pressure from migrants who can choose to become 
skilled labour is not only directly on the unskilled labour but also on the skilled labour. Second, the increased production in this case is larger than that in the case of not taking 
education. The intuition for this is that a subgroup of  the migrants work  as relatively 
more productive  skilled labour than previously worked  as  unshlled labour. Therefore, 
allowing migrants to upgrade their skills can  increase the capital stock in the short run, 
whereas it decreases for the case without education. However, in the long run, the capital 
stock drops below the benchmark in the same way  as the case of migrants who do not 
take part in education. 
The major differences for the endogenous variables emerge in the second period when 
immigrants  are treated  exactly the same as  domestic labour. Both  wages drop in the 
second period due to more skilled and unskilled labour being available. The unskilled 
wage even drops below  the benchmark. The wage ratio declines in the second period 
compared to the first period, then gradually increases till the new  steady state is reached. 
Overall, the  effect  of  migrants  with  subsequent education  on  the  wage  differential is 
positive in both the short and long run. 
Regardless of  whether migrants  are  able to  transform to  skilled labour  or remain as 
unskilled labour, the wage differential grows in both the short and the long run. However, 
the transition of wages for these two cases is different: for the case of migrants without 
subsequent education, both  skilled and unskilled wage are boosted and for the case of 
migrants with subsequent education, the skilled wage is driven up and unskilled wage is 
driven  down. The  skilled  wage  in  the  case  of  those  without  subsequent  education increases by  1.57 per cent more than that in the case of  those with  education, due to a 
larger shortage of skilled labour in line with an influx of more unskilled labour. 
3.2  Unskilled-Labour Intensive Good 
3.2.1  Temporary Migration 
The wage differential increases in the short run with a jump to 0.21 per cent and then 
drops back to the original level in the long run. In the short run, the transitions of skilled 
wage and unskilled wage are similar to those in the skill-intensive case, and an increased 
wage differential is created by a larger increase in the skilled wage than an increase in the 
unskilled wage.  However, unlike the case of  skill-intensive  good, these raised  wages 
motivate  households  to reduce  work  by  increasing  leisure  due  to  the  income  effect 
dominating the substitution effect. 
After the removal of  migrants from goods production, transitions reverse, i.e. the skilled 
wage drops below the original level due to the glut of skilled labour, especially with an 
unskilled-labour intensive production, then gradually increases back to the benchmark, 
The  unskilled  wage  also  decreases back  to  the  original  level.  Therefore, the  wage 
differential drops below the benchmark after the departure of migrants, then in  the long 
run, it adjusts back to the original level. 
3.2.2  Permanent Mgration without Subsequent Education The wage differential increases in both short and long run. The increase in the long run is 
larger than that in the short run, i.e. the wage differential increases by 0.37 per cent in the 
first period  after the  shock and increases to  0.39 per  cent in  the new  steady state. In 
comparison  with the results from the same scenario when production is skill-intensive, 
the wage differential has less variation in the long run. This shows that unslulled migrants 
have  a  smaller  effect  on  the  wage  differential  while  engaging  in  unskilled-labour 
intensive production than in skill-intensive production. The intuition for this is that the 
shock. of  unskilled  migrants  raises  relatively  less  demand  for  skilled  labour  in  the 
unskilled-labour intensive production than in the skill-intensive production and therefore, 
a smaller increase in the skilled wage. 
In the short run, as in the temporary case, the wage differential enlarges and households 
consume more leisure. However, over time, the domestic workers face competition from 
the migrants as unskilled labour, more domestic workers are motivated to become skilled 
labour, and  in so doing the education sector is boosted. Domestic households are also 
willing to reduce leisure to work more as unskilled labour in line with an increase in the 
unskilled wage. In the long run, the skilled wage is increased further than that in the short 
nm,  in line with more skilled labour being demanded in the education sector. 
3.2.3  Permanent Migration with Subsequent Education 
Although the  wage  differential  follows  a  similar transition to the  case of  permanent 
migration without education, i.e. the wage differential increases in both the short and long run and the increased extent in the long run is larger than that in the short run, a range of 
other variables react differently. The wage differential increases by 0.37 per cent in the 
first period after the shock and enlarges to 0.47 per cent in the new  steady state. This 
shows a further enlargement of the wage differential in the long run compared to the case 
of  migrants without subsequent education. The two highlighted points and the variations 
of wages for the same scenario with a skill-intensive production are still valid, 
Similar to the results of  simulations for a skill-intensive production, no matter whether 
migrants are able to transform to skilled labour or remain as unskilled  labour. the wage 
differential  grows in both the short and the long run. For the case of migrants without 
subsequent education, both the skilled and unskilled wages are raised and for the case of 
migrants with subsequent education, the skilled wage is driven up and the unskilled wage 
is driven down. The skilled wage in the case of migrants without subsequent education 
increases  by  0.65  per  cent  more  than  that  in  the  case  of  migrants  with  subsequent 
education. 
3.3  Robustness Test on the Production Function 
Table 2 shows the results  for the wage differential  simulated in  different scenarios of 
migration by  changing the production functions of goods and education from the CES to 
the Cobb-Douglas form. Table 2 Robustness Test 
CES Production  Cobb-Douglas Production 
Skilled-Int  Unskilled-Int  Skilled-Int  Unskilled-Int 
NoED  Temp  ED  NoED  Temp  NoED  Temp  ED  NoED 
Both  types  of  production  functions  provide  fairly  similar results.  The  only  cells  not 
matched are located in the category of the long-run effect with migrants without taking 
education. The similarity in  all  other cells  suggests that the results  of  the  simulations 
from the theoretical model in this paper are robust to the choice of production functions. 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper constructs a theoretical model by which the transitional and long-run effects 
of  a migration  shock  on  endogenous  variables,  including  the  skilled  wage  and  the 
unskilled wage, can be illustrated. To elucidate the investigated issue, i.e. the impact on 
the wage differential by an influx of migrants, a range of  scenarios are considered, such 
as whe*er  the goods production is skilled-labour intensive or unskilled-labour  intensive, 
whether migrants stay temporarily or permanently and whether permanent migrants take 
education  to  upgrade  skills  or  not.  Different  forms  for  the  goads  and  education 
production function are also tested to demonstrate that the results obtained are robust. 
Consistent results from different scenarios may be summarized as follows, in order to 
provide policy implications. First, the wage differential is boosted by permanent migrants 
in both the short and the long run. The increased differential in the long run is larger than that  in the  short run.  Second, if  migrants  only  stay temporarily, the wage differential 
increases in the short run and the effect dies out in the long run. Third, unskilled migrants 
have  a  smaller  effect  on  the  wage  differential  while  engaging  in  unskilled-labour 
intensive production than in skill-intensive production. Fourth, permanent migrants impel 
domestic workers to upgrade skills by demanding an increased amount of education. In 
the long run, permanent migration causes a decumulation of  the physical capital stock 
- 
due to the limited resources in the economy being drawn away from the goods production 
to education production (by which skills or human capital are accumulated), A policy to 
ensure that the economy keeps growing should be  addressed by  the government while 
adopting an open policy of migration. 
Most  of  the  existing research  suggests  that  there  is little  evidence of  an  impact  of 
immigration on domestic wages or that immigration has a negative effect on less-skilled 
native  wages.  In contrast to these  existing findings, this paper  asserts that migration 
should have a positive effect on skilled wage in both the short and long run; migration 
has a positive effect on unskilled wage in both the short and long run if migrants stay as 
unskilled labour permanently; and migration has a positive effect on unskilled wage in 
the short run and a negative effect in the long run if migrants take education to upgrade 
skills. When both wages increase,  the enlarged wage differential comes fiom a larger 
increase in the skilled wage compared to the unskilled wage. Reference 
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